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Abstract 
This article considers the notion of ‘play’ in the plastic arts, its relation to the materiality of the 
art object, and the way in which such a conception relied on a notion of aesthetic order broke 
down in the wake of Marcel Duchamp. I argue that Duchamp’s readymades force a re-
evaluation of artistic ‘play’. It is further argued that Duchamp achieved this by employing 
strategies of disguise in order to trade on an epistemic play of surfaces, revealing the 
contingency of knowledge and identity.  
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A B S T R A C T 
 
This article considers the notion of ‘play’ in the plastic arts as described by Johan Huizinga, its 
definitional relation to the materiality of the art object, and the way in which such a conception 
rests on a notion of aesthetic order that, after the work of Marcel Duchamp, could not be sus-
tained. I argue that Duchamp’s readymades force a re-evaluation of plasticity (and thus of 
Huizinga’s definition of play), and introduce a permanent revolution of plasticity, which in 
social and intellectual terms must be considered as the expression of an essential disorder un-
derlying all appearances. It is further argued that Duchamp achieved this by employing strate-
gies of disguise in order to lay bare the epistemic play of surfaces, and thus the contingency of 
knowledge and identity. Duchamp’s wager was that changing fashions in art revealed that it 
was neither formal presentation nor skill that defined art, but rather some connection to a hid-
den realm of disorder, and that this connection could be found, and repeatedly renewed, by 
ensuring that the art ‘object’ was received as an uncertain bequest.  
 
Key words: disorder, Marcel Duchamp, play, identity 
 
John Scanlan, ‘Duchamp’s Wager: Disguise, the Play of Surface and Disorder’, History of 
the Human Sciences, Vol. 16: 3 (2003), 1-20. Pre-publication version of the accepted article.  
 
 
 
 2 
Duchamp’s Wager: Disguise, the Play of Surface and 
Disorder 
 
John Scanlan 
 
 
 
Precision Oculism. Rrose Sélavy. New York-Paris. 
Complete Line of Whiskers and Kicks. 
 
Calling card for Rrose Sélavy 
 
 
 
P L A Y  A N D  P L A S T I C I T Y 
In the early twentieth century the principles that had underpinned most avant-
garde Western art since the early nineteenth century seemed yet to have an impact 
on (or could still be ignored in) the work of some influential but more classically 
directed scholars who developed connections between aesthetics and cultures of 
play. Whilst Friedrich Schiller, in his letters on aesthetics, had insisted on the im-
portance of the ‘play-drive’ in liberating beauty and aesthetic response from formal 
constraints, others played down the autonomy this granted the imagination.1 In 
Homo Ludens, his study of the play element in culture (originally published in 
1938), Johan Huizinga drew a sharp distinction between poetry, music and dance 
on the one hand, and the plastic arts – painting and sculpture – on the other.2 
Huizinga observed that the dependence of the plastic arts on matter – clay, paint, 
canvas – accounted for the difficulty in identifying this sphere of artistic activity 
with what he called ‘free play,’ meaning an activity that was without any external 
goal, or that was not limited by any external or material constraints. Painters and 
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sculptors, he believed, were denied lasting access to the play impulse because, un-
like the poet or musician, they were required – limited – by the medium: 
 
To fix a certain aesthetic impulse in matter by means of diligent and 
painstaking labour […the artist’s] inspiration may be free and vehement 
when he ‘conceives,’ but in its execution, it is always subjected to the skill 
and proficiency of the forming hand (Huizinga, 1955: 166). 
 
The point Huizinga was making was that once an object is fixed – made material – 
it is effectively captured in time and space, purely as a consequence of its materiali-
ty, and so fully present to the senses and incapable of realising a fluidity of expres-
sion found in the other arts. Thus ‘where there is no visible action’ – in finished 
painting and sculpture – ‘there can be no play’ (Huizinga, 1955: 166). The object 
of plastic creation as realised therefore brings to an end the indeterminate motion 
of play that is found in artistic creation. 
In general terms, and where it is apparent, play manifests a challenge to our 
capacity for definition, and it makes difficult the postulation of identity simply be-
cause play cannot be viewed or understood in terms of objective intentions (alt-
hough we are usually able to recognize it just as this thing ‘play,’ the generalization 
of which merely suggests the incipient disorder of a non-specific or residual cate-
gorization – as in ‘I wasn’t doing anything, just playing’). And it is appropriate that 
play to order is, as Huizinga noted, no longer play, but instead becomes a rule-
bound game; we learn to ‘play’ musical instruments, for example, by observing the 
rules of musical theory. 
The curious thing about these perceptions of play, and of the role of play in 
the plastic arts (and the explanation of why these constitute my point of departure 
here) is that this view was still expressed towards the middle of the twentieth cen-
tury. By the time Homo Ludens was published it had largely been forgotten that 
over twenty years before, in the period just before the outbreak of the First World 
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War, a revolution in the plastic arts had taken place, one that I suggest forces a 
reconsideration of this idea of the absence of the play element in ‘plastic art.’ In-
stead, as I argue, the ‘plastic’ in art would come to encompass a non-material – i.e., 
ludic or aleatory – element that was absent in Huizinga’s definition of the term, 
and that would draw on nineteenth century traditions originating with thinkers like 
Schiller.3 
 
 
I N F L U X  O F  M I N D 
The artist Marcel Duchamp had already moved through a variety of styles between 
the start of the century and the moment in 1912 when he abandoned painting, and 
perhaps reflecting his lack of impact as a conventional painter as much as his un-
ease with the limitations of the form, he made the crucial decision to look for other 
means of exploring his ideas (De Duve, 1991a).4 ‘Marcel,’ he wrote in a note to 
himself in 1912, ‘no more painting’ (Sanouillet and Peterson, 1973: 133). Du-
champ’s ‘shipwrecked’ artist as the pure individual – no schools, and no social or 
personal limits – stood in stark contrast to all that went before him; to every ‘-ism’ 
that hitherto had sought to constitute a renewed modernism (Tomkins, 1998: 84).  
In the light of his relative obscurity when he gave up painting, it is remarkable 
that within the space of ten years, Duchamp would have produced the series of ob-
jects that turned the art world upside down – although this was very much a de-
layed effect – leaving a body of work that contradicted and shocked the expecta-
tions of the art world, and that would see him cajole twentieth-century art into the 
realm of play, that Huizinga (writing in 1938), employing a notion of plasticity as 
formal constraint, believed it could not inhabit. A most important point to note in 
this conception of play – and the point of entry for the example of Duchamp – is 
the role that an idea may occupy in the domain of play: ‘play only becomes possi-
ble, thinkable and understandable,’ Huizinga had said, ‘when an influx of mind 
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breaks down the absolute determinism of the cosmos’ (Huizinga, 1955: 3). That is 
to say, play is not material, it cannot be realized in painting, in material objectivity 
generally, because in its fluidity play ‘bursts the bounds of the physically existent,’ 
and so only has significance as an interlude from what we might call the determi-
nate motion of life, which is to say, the meeting of needs, and the undertaking of 
work for definite, usually rational, ends – or indeed applying paint to canvas to 
create art (Huizinga, 1955: 4-5). Equally, the influx of mind, one may suggest, is 
entirely without content in the sense that it bypasses such ends and is thus identifi-
able as simply the decision to suspend normal modes of activity, performativity, or 
expectation. 
I want to suggest that Duchamp consciously employed disguise as a mode of 
play because he saw the pretence of masking his identity as analogical to a double-
dealing art world (a world where taste could be determined by committee), and that 
the means of coming to terms with this duplicity was through selective strategies of 
masking and unmasking. By playing hide and seek with the art world, he was able 
to show how seriously entrenched tradition was, not to mention how utterly suc-
cessful it was in the appropriation of the avant-gardes. The consequence of this 
was a re-evaluation, through his readymades, of the determinate means of painting 
as a medium, and this extended generally to a doubting of the idea that an artist 
working in the visual field had to employ plastic means (as conventionally under-
stood) at all.5 
This idea can be conveyed in one statement – that being an artist is not about 
painting, not about the medium or the skill of the forming hand, but rather about 
choosing, or differentiating, from within the world of objects and transferring what 
is taken, in a kind of abduction, to a new context where it may be considered in a 
different way. This was the influx of mind, which – to restate Huizinga’s active 
condition of play – fundamentally upset the artistic cosmos. The gap in meaning, 
in presentation, left by this manoeuvre inaugurates an aspect of play that is then 
John Scanlan, ‘Duchamp’s Wager: Disguise, the Play of Surface and Disorder’, History of 
the Human Sciences, Vol. 16: 3 (2003), 1-20. Pre-publication version of the accepted article.  
 
 
 
 6 
transferred to the viewer, who then confronts a number of apparent discrepancies: 
between surface and depth, between appearance and the context of sensible expe-
rience, and so on.  
In the readymades – everyday objects that were taken out of context and de-
clared to be ‘art,’ the viewer (and thus the status of the object) are caught between 
possibility and actuality, something and nothing. It is not always accurate to de-
scribe the readymades as ‘objects’ without confusing matters (a point I will return 
to later), but these items found already made, only became ‘readymades,’ accord-
ing to Duchamp, as a condition of their contingency both in and as a kind of ‘ren-
dezvous.’ In the former case, this was as a meeting of the idea of the readymade and 
the designated object – that is, in finding/choosing the object, and in the latter 
case as ‘being subject to all kinds of delays’ – which one presumes is the delay that 
intervenes after Duchamp’s choice and prior to the determination of the objective 
meaning of the item to, say, a viewer, as Duchamp noted in this well-known ‘speci-
fication’ for the readymade: 
 
Specifications for ‘Readymades’: by planning for a moment to come (on 
such a day, such a date such a minute), ‘to inscribe a readymade’ – The 
ready made can later be looked for. – (with all kinds of delays). The im-
portant thing then is just this matter of timing, this snapshot effect […] It 
is a kind of rendezvous (sic) (Sanouillet and Peterson, 1973: 32).  
 
The readymade can be seen as a wager, and this note identifies the moment when 
Duchamp brings his part of the play to an end – by the act of differentiation, choice 
(or whatever we might call it: this snapshot effect). A highly contentious aspect of 
this notion of making or creating art was in the role it gave to an unknown public 
(as compared to the expert role normally assumed by figures within the art world). 
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In an interview with Pierre Cabanne, Duchamp explained his perception of how 
this wager may come to some resolution: 
 
The artist makes something, then one day, he is recognized by the inter-
vention of the public, of the spectator […] you can’t stop that, because in 
brief it’s the product of two poles – there’s the one pole of the one who 
makes the work, and the pole of the one who looks at it. I give the latter as 
much importance as the one who makes it (Cabanne, 1971: 70).  
 
Duchamp’s ‘delays’ can also be understood in terms of the time it takes for 
these two poles to meet, with the unknown arrival of the viewing eye leaving an 
essential tension hanging over the question of meaning.8 This tension might not 
be evident in the ‘visible action’ of some phenomena (as, for example, with the per-
formance of dance) but the anxiety produced by these readymades was enough, as 
we shall see, to prevent the establishment of a fixed, or stable meaning regarding 
the status of the work within the tradition into which it was cast. As Octavio Paz has 
said, the readymades seemed by turns baffling and dangerous; they saw Duchamp 
‘juggling with knives,’ and succeeding, he believes: 
 
Because, in the end, the gesture is a philosophical or, rather dialectical 
game more than an artistic operation: it is a negation which, through hu-
mour, becomes affirmation. Suspended by irony, in a state of perpetual 
oscillation, this affirmation is always provisional (Paz, 1970: 17).  
 
The effect of the readymade was to remove the frame – the frame of reference, 
as well as the actual physical boundaries of a frame that separates a canvas from the 
context in which it hangs, a separation that sees the playfulness of artistic creativity 
terminate with the object itself, bound and finitely given within space and time. As 
Thierry de Duve has said, ‘in front of a readymade there is no longer any technical 
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difference between making art and appreciating it’ (De Duve, 1996: 290). The 
removal of framing devices became the condition for the readymade and the reali-
zation that with it came also the denial of aesthetic expectations and hierarchies. In 
short the unframing is the introduction of disorder as an element of the play of sur-
faces. Nevertheless, by the time Johan Huizinga’s thoughts on play were published 
in Homo Ludens Duchamp was largely forgotten within the art world, a situation 
that left the laconic outsider apparently unconcerned: he was more determined to 
become a chess champion than to remain an artist. His star was not to rise again 
until the likes of John Cage, Robert Rauschenberg and Jasper Johns attained 
prominence in the 1960’s, citing Duchamp as an important influence. As the con-
sequence of another – rather different – delay, however, his status as the father of 
conceptual art would be sealed by the end of the twentieth century, along with his 
reputation as the master prankster of modern art, its devil in disguise, a reputation 
that derives, chiefly, from one particularly puzzling bequest. 
 
 
T H E  O B J E C T  I N  T H E  W R O N G  P L A C E 
For a long time, modernist and avant-garde art had been shocking and iconoclastic 
in its presentation (Compagnon, 1994; Phillipson, 1985; Watts, 1980). In large 
part the shock effect accompanied the presentation of something familiar within a 
new context, or in a new form. For example, Manet’s two most infamous paintings, 
Déjeuner sur l’herbe and Olympia were both greeted with disapproval partly be-
cause of the de-contextualizing of archetypes (in these two cases the female nude), 
but also in respect of the upsetting of formal presentation (Manet used painterly 
devices to highlight the work’s artifice that shocked the viewer into attention) 
(Compagnon, 1994; Jay, 1993). The archetypal nude, for example, carried with it 
a history of depiction that regulated the aesthetic conditions for understanding the 
presentation of the form itself; it was considered unacceptable, for moral reasons  
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1. Fountain, (‘R. Mutt’) Marcel Duchamp, 1917. Photograph by Alfred Stieglitz.  
 
 
and because of the suggestion of impropriety, to have clothed male figures pre-
sented alongside the nude figure of a female as Manet had depicted. 
So, the upsetting of expectations was in many ways nothing new. However, 
Marcel Duchamp’s 1917 piece Fountain went several steps further than any pre-
vious shock gestures. This ‘sculpture,’ as it was sometimes referred to at the time, 
was not actually a fountain, but rather an upturned urinal – a mass-produced piece 
of bathroom equipment. It was neither sculpture nor painting. The significance of 
the de-contextualized urinal was found in the impact it made on questions of rep-
resentation, and in issues it raised regarding the contextual limits on the meaning 
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of a work of art. With Fountain this becomes so pronounced that identification 
between a work of art and the world need no longer bother an artist at all. Contrast 
this with the situation prior to the Readymade, to the other modernist innovations 
we are familiar with – impressionism, fauvism, or cubism for example, all of which, 
as Jerrold Seigel suggests, ‘had been undertaken for some aesthetic purpose, to 
expand art’s subject matter, extend its expressive range, or heighten its perceptual 
power’ (Seigel, 1995: 115).  
By contrast Duchamp saw artistic conventions as a succession of disguises; 
this year’s fashion in painting was simply the empirically given surface which could 
charm, or transform, the essential disorder that lay beyond these limits and con-
ventions. In effect the representation was a stylistic convention, a disguise con-
cealing a deeper ambiguity regarding objects of presentation and questions of me-
diation. Duchamp regarded modernism as evidence of this essential lack of depth, 
and so where other ‘schools’ were concerned with the development of modernist 
self-criticism as a mode of expression, Duchamp could not fit into this ideal. He 
saw himself, in his own words, ‘shipwrecked,’ alone – he was no longer interested 
in expanding the form of painting, yet having been a painter he was still concerned 
with what he regarded to be the limitations imposed by stylistic conventions, or 
personal habits, and these were just some of the reasons he gave up painting (one 
suspects equal amounts of boredom and impatience). Another reason was that he 
considered artistic freedom in more radical terms than had hitherto been ex-
pressed in modernity: as absolute freedom from any social or personal demands. 
This was the absolute isolation of the apostate – once inside, now apart, con-
demned by conscience to be forever set against the very milieu that provided 
grounds for the substance of the disagreement. Duchamp pursued this absolute 
freedom by developing a peculiar indifference to the art world around him, and this 
was expressed as a desire not to have to make art out of any professional duty, or 
even aesthetic impulse (impulses which could be denied), and this also explains 
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why for the majority of his life he earned his living through a variety of occupations 
and endeavours (giving French language tuition, dealing in art) but not through 
making art. ‘There are two kinds of artists,’ he said: ‘the artist that deals with socie-
ty, is integrated into society; and the other artist, the completely freelance artist, 
who has no obligations’ (Sanouillet and Petersen, 1973: 133). He sought, in other 
words the freedom of pure play, rather than the rational limits of Kantian freedom, 
which is the freedom of man as a social being, freedom consequent on plurality in 
being rather than singularity. 
Another important aspect of the development of the play element was in the 
use he began to make of the accidental. The various ‘rendezvous’ that brought the 
readymades into being seemed on the one hand to result from whim (if we accept 
Duchamp’s ‘specification for the readymade’) although the impossibility of de-
stroying the link between the eye that sees (and selects) and one’s memory of likes 
and dislikes seems obvious, and so somewhat mitigates any rigorous claim that 
there was something random about his choice of objects. It is rather that the 
chance element was contained in the fact that Duchamp was effectively gambling 
on the reception of the readymades by posterity (on the moment of rendezvous), 
and one reason he gave up on painting was that he perceived the resolution of this 
wager to be unforeseeable in all forms of artistic activity anyway: 
 
The danger is in pleasing an immediate public, the immediate public that 
comes around you and takes you in and accepts you and gives you success 
and everything. Instead of that, you should wait fifty or a hundred years 
for your true public (Sanouillet and Peterson, 1973: 133).  
 
To paint for a living, it seemed, was to compromise the purity of the artistic 
impulse; although, attempting to unearth Duchamp’s intentions by taking a closer 
look at the evidence left behind in interviews and notes is a precarious exercise, 
always likely to founder on the possibility that he was being far from candid, and 
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this is especially the case with his interviews. Having said that, the existence of the 
notes collected as the Green Box indicated a sustained level of creative activity and 
suggest that many of the readymades appear to have been ‘created’ far from acci-
dentally (Sanouillet and Peterson, 1973: 26-71).6 Nevertheless, the importance of 
the second, delayed, rendezvous marks these items out as no ordinary artworks; 
they realized no real craft, no expression of self, and in lacking this creative identi-
ty they are then seen to be meaningful only in the act of observation.   
For his part of this wager, as Duchamp reveals in his recollection of the choice 
of the earliest readymades, the most important element in the act of differentiation 
was realized by the slightest personal touch – by making the merest alteration to 
the item, yet one that produced the displaced object as artwork: 
 
In 1913 I had the happy idea to fasten a bicycle wheel to a kitchen stool 
and watch it turn. A few months later I bought a cheap reproduction of a 
winter evening landscape, which I called ‘Pharmacy’ after adding two 
small dots, a red one and a yellow one, in the horizon. In New York in 
1915 I bought at a hardware store a snow shovel on which I wrote ‘In Ad-
vance of the Broken Arm’ (Sanouillet and Peterson, 1973: 141-42).  
 
And as Thierry De Duve argues thus was born an idea that would revolution-
ize art in the twentieth century: the idea that the artist would respect no limitations 
of form, matter, or mediation (De Duve, 1998). These early ‘prototypes’ for the 
readymade also went beyond contemporaneous attempts, by Duchamp and others, 
to break formal representational limitations (De Duve, 1991a). For example, the 
attempt in futurist painting to incorporate motion into a work of art was eclipsed 
by the fact that Bicycle Wheel was a ‘moving sculpture’ – although it conveyed a 
motion which had no point, no goal, as the circular motion of the upturned wheel 
prevented the possibility of the linear progression of rational movement (Seigel, 
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1995: 122; Ades, et al, 1999: 47). Here, too, the circular movement is analogous 
to the play motion: directionless, and non-teleological. 
A key aspect of the development of his notion of the readymade is that it re-
veals Duchamp at beginning a long history of fascination with disguise. These 
games of hide and seek would continue throughout his life culminating in Etant 
donnés (Given), a work which takes the play of ambiguity to the limit by the very 
condition that the viewer was required to give legitimacy to the notion that the sur-
face conceals some unknown depths by the necessity of voyeuristically placing 
oneself in front of the peephole on the exterior of the work (a large, roughly con-
structed, wooden door), in order to try and figure out what is going on behind.7  
Taken as a whole Duchamp’s work represents a journey that was not possible 
to the same extent within the tradition of painting. For Duchamp, the problem 
with painting was partially that the necessity of working with certain accepted ma-
terials itself imposed a limitation, in that the artist standing with brush in hand 
would find it difficult to avoid self-expression and so it was the medium of expres-
sion itself that was blocking the realization of ideas. He considered painting as one 
means of expression ‘among others’:  
 
and not a complete end for life at all; in the same way I consider that color 
is only a means of expression in painting and not an end. In other words, 
painting should not be exclusively retinal or visual; it should have to do 
with the gray matter (Sanouillet and Peterson, 1973: 135-36).  
 
The connection between the acceptability of means of expression, the use of a 
particular medium, and artistic autonomy, was at the root of the problem for Du-
champ. The autonomous artist, like the autonomous subject in the history of 
Western philosophy, was thought to be ‘transparent,’ and this was reflected in the 
assumption that art, particularly ‘realist’ art, was comprehensible – that is to say 
susceptible to understanding on the basis of what can be visualized, and assimilat-
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ed to some previously established categorical knowledge; the rational mind as-
sumes that what is on the surface is representative of something coherent, some-
thing genuine and fixed, rather than something fleeting or elusive (Pippin,  1991: 
12-13; 34-38).  
We might suggest that Duchamp’s problem with painting could be stated 
thus: the painting, relying on its bounded, finite form, as the prima facie evidence 
of plastic activity (and its full stop), presents the artist as someone who attempts to 
connect with some truth, but instead of accepting the empirical evidence of surfac-
es, or indeed that the flat plane of the canvas could present anything more than an 
opinion in a diverting form, Duchamp preferred to say (so it seems) that the sur-
face presentation of the world when aligned to the artist’s view of ‘reality’, was 
wholly contingent. It was really no more than an a mask of appearance (but this fact 
was concealed by the necessity of adhering to a particular form and medium), and 
that therefore this surface could be pulled off to reveal that all such presentations 
were really no more than a series of ‘just suppose’ statements. Duchamp’s delays 
were also, therefore, a perhaps, but unlike art that assumed representational verac-
ity they did not pretend to be otherwise; on the contrary, they gloried in their am-
biguity. Where painting had become a safe bet, Duchamp now proposed to wager 
with abandon. 
The readymades as ambiguous ‘objects’ derive their force from the separation 
of object and functional domain. They are unlike any other objects of art, in so far 
as they turn the space of art into a playground, although this not in virtue of the 
objects taking on the appearance of toys; the readymades are disruptive because 
they stand in denial of the possibility of a contextual understanding – as trans-
formed utilitarian objects they are simply ‘in the wrong place’ (Basalla, 1982). And 
as playful bequests that are only fully realized by the observer engaging in the play 
they remain forever suspended, existing only as a ‘perhaps,’ or as a Duchampian 
‘delay.’ The implication of the delay then consists in the fact that it opens up a gap 
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in understanding and brings us face to face with the ambiguity of appearances. 
Perhaps it is only through an act of cunning, of devilish intent, that things are gen-
erally what we believe them to be (or perhaps we should say what one calls them), 
and that epistemic certainty consists in the charming of disorder; which is to say 
that sense, reason, and language transform this disorder to make a fetish of ap-
pearances.  
The readymade introduced the uneasy suggestion that it is we who objectify 
the world – nothing is given in the sense that everything requires the mediation of 
interpretation; everything is conveyed via language and categories, and so on. By 
de-contextualizing the object (i.e., by removing the identity of the object) and add-
ing some dissociative title Duchamp had: 
 
Carried to its highest point pictorial nominalism, that is, the substitution 
of the linguistic for the plastic in art, or of the discourse on art for the art 
object, ever silent in its revolt and therefore subject to appropriation 
(Compagnon, 1994: 101). 
 
The art object established by naming (i.e., not in terms of properties or obvi-
ous features, was only contingently given) could take on an infinite number of 
meanings – it was the wager as a bequest. Not only did ‘the object’ not exist within 
a frame; in its boundlessness it could not at the time be contained by the logic of an 
ordering mind, nor slotted into a neat definitional ‘box,’ as perhaps the product of 
yet another of modernism’s countless ‘isms.’ 
 
 
I N S C R I P T I O N  A N D  D E C E P T I O N 
Duchamp’s first proper readymade (i.e., the first wholly abducted object) was a 
bottle dryer that he purchased in 1914. It remained a bottle dryer until 1915 when 
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he wrote to his sister in Paris, who had possession of the item, explaining the sig-
nificance of the object, and asked her then to paint an inscription on the bottom, 
and then sign it with the words ‘[after] Marcel Duchamp.’ By this exercise of an 
authorial power – delivered by proxy, no less – the bottle rack was removed from 
context, differentiated by choice, and given a unique status (by contrast with which 
the prior functional purpose of the object seemed merely to consign it to a lowly, 
banal and utilitarian place in the world). This was the magical power of the authori-
al inscription to disorder categorical placement. 
The mass produced urinal that became Fountain (after being turned upside 
down and finished off, again, with the signature of the ‘artist’) was the first ready-
made to be brought to public attention, and is arguably the item which more than 
any other produced by Duchamp, changed the artistic landscape of the 20th centu-
ry. Despite the apparent random gesture of taking a familiar and widely available 
object and using it in this way, there was a high level of planning involved in the 
public unveiling, and eventual reception of this object. And it is the play of the 
public appearance/non-appearance of the readymade that eventually unveils its 
shattering proclamation that one need not paint to be an artist, nor exercise the 
skill of hand in the formation of some object – that anything goes. In order to 
achieve this effect Duchamp not only presented a certain object under disguise, as 
it were (thus its status as an ‘object’ and the language of objectivity becomes ques-
tionable), but he had to go to elaborate lengths to disguise his own identity as the 
person behind Fountain – and so it bore the signature of a mysterious ‘R. Mutt’ 
(later ‘identified’ as Richard Mutt). 
The first public display of Fountain was intended to be the exhibition of the 
American Society of Independent Artists in New York in 1917, and although Du-
champ was actually chairman of the hanging committee for this particular show, in  
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2. Marcel Duchamp, in an-
other of his disguises, as 
Rrose Sélavy. Photograph by 
Man Ray, 1921.  
 
 
 
the end Fountain remained hidden – like Duchamp’s identity as the actual person 
behind its submission – it was veiled by a curtain and set apart from the rest of the 
show, secluded, for the time being, from public view because the Society did not 
know what to make of it (De Duve, 1991b; Camfield, 1991). The duplicity of Du-
champ’s role in the whole affair is reinforced by the decisions he took as leader of 
the hanging committee for the exhibition.  
Firstly, he decided that the works – and these numbered thousands – should 
be displayed in alphabetical order, thus eschewing conventional hanging practices, 
which relied on establishing some context for the apprehension of the work (nor-
mally ordering by chronology or by artistic school). The second important decision 
that Duchamp was also behind was that for this show there would be ‘no jury, no 
prizes,’ and thus no official declaration of relative merit or worth – no ordering of 
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value. In the end, however, as Fountain was denied a place in the exhibition by the 
decision of what can only be described as a jury (Duchamp’s own colleagues), we 
are led to conclude that this exclusion may have been just what Duchamp had 
hoped for (De Duve, 1996). 
By presenting an object that was unidentifiable within the context of this exhi-
bition, Duchamp revealed that role of the jury (a body established to adjudicate on 
matters of value) was to employ social means to overcome a universal and subjec-
tive inability to remain an indifferent observer: it revealed also a tendency to stick 
with what we know, which is to say with that which can be assigned a place in some 
order. The ambiguity of Fountain could not be allowed to dwell over the exhibi-
tion, to scandalize the whole affair, the jury decided, and thus it was excluded; 
along with difficult questions over the Society’s apparent openness to new art. 
Nevertheless, the excluded object did overtake events as Duchamp, once again 
anonymously (i.e., in disguise), published a defence of the readymade in an issue 
of a magazine called The Blind Man.9 
As well as submitting the object under the name of Richard Mutt, Duchamp 
took the ruse to extreme lengths by fooling friends who were fellow members of 
the Society of Independents, as well as others such as the influential gallery owner 
and dealer Alfred Stieglitz, who afterwards famously photographed Fountain (thus 
contributing to its iconic status), believing it to be the work of R. Mutt, an unfor-
tunate artist slighted by the narrow minded attitude of the Society. Thus Du-
champ’s deception was total – he even withheld his true role in the affair from his 
own sister Suzanne, to whom he wrote, “One of my female friends under a mascu-
line pseudonym, Richard Mutt, sent in a porcelain urinal as a sculpture” (De Duve, 
1998: 104). The entire scandal of the American Independents show, and the case 
of Richard Mutt, was an elaborate set-up by Duchamp, a test to see how accurate 
was the claim of the Independents that any artist who paid the fee of six dollars 
could display their work. Ostensibly, this democratic condition was a demonstra-
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tion of openness, a gesture that removed aesthetic hierarchies, although as Du-
champ was to discover, this attitude was simply a front, and in effect, the American 
Society of Independents had a well-formed idea of what could be shown within an 
art context, and this did not include the profane Fountain (Camfield, 1991: 133-
84).   
What, then, may we draw from Duchamp’s actions here? What was the real 
import of this gesture – the readymade, this strange bequest?  
The notion of readymade, and the ambiguity over its role and meaning, effec-
tively throws our attention onto something else in order to try and resolve the una-
voidable ‘what is it’ question that such uncertain phenomena seem to provoke, and 
it is impossible to explore this without confronting the question of identity. The 
ontological status of identity – as both a principle of correspondence and individu-
ation – presents an apparent duality that actually disguises the knowledge that 
identification by one means is at the same time the negative performance of the 
other (or, as Hegel would have said, every determination is a negation). In other 
words an identity established through similarity (correspondence) or individuation 
(difference) is an act of disconnection that seeks – however consciously or other-
wise this is pursued – to give it some order to experience (and thus to the world). 
The readymade object itself, therefore, still raises important questions about the 
objective identity that art is presumed to establish between the artist and the work 
on the one hand, and the something that produces the creative impulse on the oth-
er (presumably for the artist this would be the identity that brings together or uni-
fies discrete ideas/phenomena, resulting in the inspired idea). Duchamp’s eleva-
tion of the conceptual in art may be understood as more than simply a decision to 
give up painting; it may be viewed as an opportunity to explore identity itself 
through the strategic adoption of disguise.  
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P L A Y  A S  D I S O R D E R 
Part of the revolutionary impact of the readymades can be glimpsed in the way that 
Duchamp, like no one else before, situates disguise within the most elementary 
constructive practices of everyday life. We should recall that modern painters be-
fore Duchamp operated from an aesthetic of authenticity (and the idea still persists 
that it is the physical contact of the artist with the materials of painting that identi-
fies the authentic artist). Even after many decades of conceptual shocks the influx 
of ‘gray matter’ into the work of art still causes controversy. Duchamp sought to 
undermine the authenticity of the artist with play and irony, but equally introduced 
a radically disordering element in the suggestion that the artistic rearrangement of 
the object world (in painting) was the establishment of order. The readymade, 
then, initiated a radical missorting of this art world. As Octavio Paz wrote:  
 
If the centre is in a state of permanent schism, if the ancient notions of solid 
matter and clear and distinct reason disappear, the result is general disorien-
tation […] Duchamp’s intention is to get rid forever of ‘the possibility of 
recognizing any two things as being like each other’ (Paz, 1970: 10).   
 
The play of disorder makes for unstable identities, this is certain. But it is of 
crucial importance that the destructive intention of Duchamp’s ‘statements’ was 
equalled by a subjective indifference to the world. Duchamp’s work says that we 
should just forget about meaning in art having anything to do with the artist – like 
the weather it rather has something more to do with chance. And chance is in the 
role of creativity passed to the beholder of the readymade, and so the ‘creative acts’ 
became as myriad, as unpredictable, and as indivisible as the quanta of the physical 
world (Compagnon, 1994: 102). Certainly by redefining and legitimising a new 
kind of artistic ‘creativity’ the readymades uncovered a world of seemingly discrete 
objects that could be pulled together – or framed – by ambiguous and contingent 
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identifications. It is by unveiling the object in the wrong place that a move away 
from plasticity (in Huizinga’s terms) and towards the accidental occurs. Thus, the 
object is only truly created by overcoming the delay that separates the two poles 
that resolve its objective ambiguity (as an out of place object), and thus chance is in 
the meeting of the readymade with the eye and mind of the observer. It is this that 
is the crucial demonstration of the fragility of identity in modern society.  
But this was only revealed by another play of identity, one that took ambiguity 
and playfulness with the idea of the artist as bearer of an authentic identity and 
transferred it into the social realm as the immanent disorder of all identity rela-
tions. Thus, whilst we know of Duchamp’s adoption of disguise mostly with regard 
to the R. Mutt and Rrose Sélavy personae he was also: 
 
Marcel Douxami, Marsélavy, and Sélatz, not to mention the ersatz names 
he was given by others: Victor and Totor by Henri-Pierre Roché, Marchand 
du sel by Robert Desnos, Pierre Delaire by Henri Waste (De Duve, 1998: 
399-400).  
 
A final act in this unstable existence is found in the Wanted poster of 1923, an 
imitation of a police circular featuring Duchamp posing as a criminal, ‘George W. 
Welch’ alias ‘Bull’ alias ‘Pickens’ etcetry etcetry (it goes on). The police mug-shot, 
with its depiction of the full face and side profile was supposed to supply the final 
means of identification, but as Victor Stoichita has pointed out, Duchamp – whilst 
presenting his own face – still manages to mask the conventional dialogue of the 
mug-shot, which is given by having the side view look towards the frontal view as if: 
 
The person’s identity were thought to be engaged in the stimulating conver-
sation of a schize […] Duchamp unveils the illusion: what we see is a dis-
rupted representation, a representation where the mould of the double  
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3. Wanted/$2000 Re-
ward, Marcel Duchamp, 
1923.  
 
 
mug-shot introduces a concealed but significant breach, a representation 
that does not promote an affirmation of identity but of false identity (Stoichi-
ta, 1997: 226-27). 
 
 
Thus, the one remaining means of confirming identity – whilst appearing to be 
utterly genuine in its presentation – is subverted by the simplest alteration (the 
reconfiguration of the mugshot). 
It may be presumptuous given all that has been said up to this point to even ut-
ter the word truth…but perhaps the truth is that once Duchamp gave up painting, 
and thus the kind of self-expression that could be recognized and understood, he 
no longer knew, or cared who he was – he had tried to paint in the style of the 
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Fauves, of Cubism, but realized that these periods were just like costumes he was 
able to adorn himself with, to suit the fashion of the day. This, he believed, was 
how it all worked: it was all a game. When asked once to find a way of conveying 
what his work meant, Duchamp said that the only word he could find to describe 
his work was ‘metaphysical.’ It was: 
 
pushing the idea of doubt [found] in Descartes…to a much further point 
than they ever did in the school of Cartesianism: doubt in myself, doubt in 
everything…in the end it comes to doubt the verb ‘to be’ (Ades, et al, 
1999: 61).  
 
In the play of ambiguity, a doubt was thus introduced, and it is this that becomes 
the most potent symbol of the relation between plasticity, play and disorder. ‘To 
be’ is the verb that identifies through equivalence, that yet designates also exclu-
sion, the ‘what is not’ of belonging, the ‘=’ of contraction, the ‘is’ that declares the 
contingent relation of its own identity, because ‘to be’ is also … to be in doubt. 
 
 
E N D N O T E S 
 
1. See Schiller (1994), letters 11 to 15. Others, such as Victor Cousin (1792-
1867) in Lectures on the True, the Beautiful and the Good (1836) claimed that 
the essence of aesthetic creation was not to be found in form or material; that 
‘what expression tries to make felt, is not what the eye can see and the hand 
touch, evidently it is something invisible.’ (in Harrison, Wood, and Gaiger1998: 
194) 
 
2. Johan Huizinga was a Dutch historian (1872-1945). His other major works 
include The Waning of the Middle Ages (1919), and Erasmus (1924). 
 
3. Huizinga (1955: 168), in discussing Schiller’s notion of the ‘play instinct’, 
dismisses such a ‘psychic function […] as somewhat inadequate.’ To derive art 
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wholly from ‘some hypothetical “play-instinct” obliges us to do the same for ar-
chitecture and painting,’ something her regarded as ‘preposterous’. 
 
4. Duchamp (1887-1968) began his artistic career as a conventional painter, for 
the most part following the latest artistic trends. He first attained fame, if not no-
toriety, for a ‘Cubo-Futurist’ painting, Nude Descending a Staircase (1911-12), 
which caused a scandal at the ‘Armory Show’ in New York City, 1913 (otherwise 
know as The International Exhibition of Modern Art, held at New York’s 69th 
Regiment Armory). See Tomkins (1998) for full historical background. 
 
5. ‘Readymades’ were everyday items (objects already made), the first being a bot-
tle-dryer, which Duchamp signed (as an artist would sign a painting) and thus 
declared to be art. The signature therefore confirmed their ‘creation,’ which was 
given legitimacy by a subsequent elevation from the practical functionality that 
determined the everyday use of these objects to the aesthetic context of the art 
world, where they would now be displayed as art. See Ades, et al (1999) De 
Duve (1996) and Paz (1970).  
 
6. The Green Box consists of notes originally published in 1934, detailing the de-
velopment of Duchamp’s ideas for a number of specific works, as well as giving 
written form to some of his concepts, including the ‘readymade’. The Green Box 
is published in Sanouillet and Peterson (eds.) (1973) The Writings of Marcel 
Duchamp. 
 
7. The full title of this work, which was completed over a 20-year period, is Etant 
donnés: 1 La Chute d’eau 2.Le gaz d’eclairage (Given: 1. The Waterfall 2. The 
Illuminating Gas). For more detail on the genesis and context of this work, see 
Ades, et al (1999: 190-205), who describe the work thus: ‘Etant donnés is 
three-dimensional but can never be seen (or photographed) as a whole. In a bare 
room […] is a large wooden door set in a brick arch. There is no visible means of 
opening the door, but two small holes at eye level invite closer inspection. What 
is seen through the holes is startling and unexpected. Beyond a dark space and a 
jagged whole in a brick wall is a brilliantly lit landscape with, in the foreground, 
the ‘real’ figure of a woman, prone, naked, legs splayed to the spectator. In her 
raised left arm she holds a small gas lamp, faintly glowing.’ (193) 
 
8. Duchamp, in his working notes published as The Green Box, spoke of his crea-
tions as ‘delays’: ‘Use delay instead of picture or painting,’ a description he said 
was ‘a way of succeeding in no longer thinking that the thing in question is a pic-
ture – to make a delay of it [i.e., the work of art] in the most general way possible, 
not so much in the different meanings in which delay can be taken, but rather in 
their indecisive reunion [my emphasis].’ (quoted in Sanouillet and Peterson, 
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1973: 26). That is to say, the notion of delay describes the indeterminate recep-
tion of the art object by the audience; an audience that – as I have said – have a 
significant, if not equal part in the ‘creation’ of the object in bringing to it their 
own interpretations (which may subjectively resolve the delay, but do not guar-
antee that the ‘delay’ can ever be overcome in the objective sense of rendering 
the art work meaningful). 
 
9. The defence was actually anonymously authored (although it is thought to have 
been written by Duchamp himself) and published as an editorial in The Blind 
Man, a magazine that had been published by Duchamp and a few friends to coin-
cide with the exhibition. The defence of Fountain and its ‘creator’ R. Mutt took 
the form of an open letter to the Society of Independent Artists, declaring that an 
aesthetic contribution had been made as Mr. Mutt ‘took an ordinary article of 
life, placed it so that its useful significance disappeared under the new title and 
point of view,’ meaning that he had ‘created a new thought for that object’ (in 
Tomkins, 1998: 185). Near the end of his life Duchamp told Pierre Cabanne 
that he had written the name ‘R. Mutt’ on the urinal to ‘avoid connection with the 
personal’ and that the scandal was intensified because the organisers, through 
gossip, suspected he had sent the object, although circumstances decreed that 
this was something he could not confirm. See Pierre Cabanne (1971: 55).  
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